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Rules, Standards, and the 
Reality of Obviousness 
Brenda M. Simon† 
Abstract 
Obviousness, the great question of patent law, is a muddle. 
Attempts to clarify the doctrine face a significant obstacle—the goal 
of providing efficient and cost-effective prosecution limits the amount 
of time patent examiners can spend determining obviousness. As a 
result, examiners use the analogous arts test as a rough gauge of 
obviousness during prosecution. The hope was that the analogous arts 
test would provide an efficient, rules-based approach to obviousness. 
The Federal Circuit has not, however, provided much guidance on 
how to apply the analogous arts test, resulting in a soft rule, at best.  
While this uncertainty may be tolerable during prosecution, where 
time-pressed examiners can be forgiven for relying on common sense 
among other things, courts should no longer rely on the outdated 
analogous arts test as a shortcut to find inventions obvious. During 
litigation, more time and resources can be spent on the obviousness 
assessment. At that time, decision makers should use a more 
appropriate standard, requiring assessment of common practices in 
the field of invention and whether the invention is obvious in light of 
these practices. This shift in the focus of the obviousness analysis 
during litigation should result in a more accurate determination of 
obviousness when it matters most. 
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Introduction 
Courts and patent examiners face several challenges in assessing 
whether an invention is too obvious to deserve patent protection.1 
One of the greatest obstacles is the need to balance the benefits of  
1. To address these problems, commentators have set forth numerous 
proposals, such as altering the presumption of validity, providing more 
rigorous examination, and considering whether a patent would have 
been necessary ex ante to induce innovation. See, e.g., Michael 
Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of 
Patentability, 120 Yale L.J. 1590, 1596 (2011) (proposing a shift from 
the cognitive model of analyzing nonobviousness to one that relies on 
inducement theory); Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking 
Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 45, 59–61 
(2007) (questioning the presumption of validity); Glynn S. Lunney Jr., 
E-Obviousness, 7 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 363, 412, 416 
(2001) (discussing inducement in the context of e-commerce patents); 
Kristen Osenga, Entrance Ramps, Tolls, and Express Lanes—Proposals 
for Decreasing Traffic Congestion in the Patent Office, 33 Fla. St. U. 
L. Rev. 119, 121–22 (2005) (offering proposals to adjust the 
examination process in terms of speed and quality). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 1·2014 
Rules, Standards, and the Reality of Obviousness 
27 
certainty with the goal of rewarding innovation, which often shifts 
paradigms and upsets predictability.2 These countervailing interests 
often arise in the classic debate about rules and standards.3 Rules 
provide ex ante certainty that supports investment, while standards 
afford the ability to recognize creativity and innovation.4  
In the last two decades, the United States Supreme Court has 
rejected many of the attempts to bring greater certainty to patent 
law.5 The Court has recognized that the use of standards, rather than 
rules, provides the flexibility necessary to assess patentability.6 For 
example, in its 2007 decision on obviousness, the Court disavowed the 
Federal Circuit’s rigid requirement that the prior art contain a 
teaching, suggestion, or motivation to be combined.7 Instead, the 
Court advanced a flexible standard, deciding obviousness in light of 
“[t]he diversity of inventive pursuits and of modern technology.”8 
Attempts to reevaluate the doctrine of obviousness in light of the 
rules versus standards debate should recognize the realities of 
prosecution and litigation. During prosecution, examiners have limited 
time and resources to determine obviousness. Consequently, they have 
attempted to use the analogous arts test as a bright-line rule to 
truncate the process. The doctrine of analogous art provides that 
examiners can only use references found to be analogous in assessing 
 
2. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of 
Patentability, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 609, 611 (2009). 
3. See id. at 611; see generally Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 
UCLA L. Rev. 379 (1985) (explaining the tension between standards 
and rules in legal arguments). Schlag discusses the example of a driver 
approaching a railroad crossing: a rule would require the driver to stop 
and look, while a standard would state that the driver needs to act with 
reasonable caution. Id. at 379. The rule implements the basics of 
exercising care, while the standard allows for situations where it would 
not be safe for the driver to stop. Id. 
4. Duffy, supra note 2, at 611. 
5. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010); eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 (2006); Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002); KSR 
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007). 
6. See David Olson & Stefania Fusco, Rules Versus Standards: Competing 
Notions of Inconsistency Robustness in Patent Law, 64 Ala. L. Rev. 
647, 649, 664, 683 (2013) (“[T]he Federal Circuit regularly chooses rules 
while the Supreme Court regularly chooses standards in patent 
law . . . .”). 
7. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 419. 
8. Id. at 418 (“[An obviousness] analysis need not seek out precise 
teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, 
for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a 
[PHOSITA] would employ.”). 
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nonobviousness; they cannot consider nonanalogous art.9 The Federal 
Circuit has provided little guidance on how to apply the test; it has 
been criticized as unpredictable—a soft rule, at best. 
Perhaps worse than its subjectivity, the analogous arts test has 
become dated, focusing the analysis on factors that are no longer 
important or relevant. In many fields, invention is often a 
collaborative, or at least simultaneous, phenomenon.10 Further, 
increased access to searchable information and processing power 
provides additional time to consider a wider range of prior art.11 In 
light of these changes, courts and examiners have expansively defined 
the scope of analogous arts.12 This is problematic because once a 
decision maker classifies art as analogous and therefore allowed to be 
considered, an obviousness finding is often a given.13 Like the 
teaching, suggestion, or motivation test, the analogous arts test has 
allowed courts to be “cognitive misers” in assessing obviousness, 
limiting “the burdens of processing technical information.”14 
While subjectivity during prosecution can be tolerated given the 
limitations under which examiners operate, courts should no longer 
use the dated and unpredictable analogous arts test as a pretext for 
approving “complex inventions difficult for judges to understand” 
while excluding “less mysterious inventions a judge can understand.”15 
Unlike examiners, litigants generally have more time and resources to 
 
9. The analogous arts test asks (1) whether the art is from the same field 
of endeavor and, if not, (2) “whether the reference still is reasonably 
pertinent to the particular problem” the invention seeks to solve. In re 
Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658–59 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Innovention Toys, L.L.C., v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 
637 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
10. Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 
709, 750 (2012) (“Invention is a social phenomenon, not one driven by 
lone geniuses.”).  
11. Of course, the time associated with considering additional art is neither 
free nor without limits. See Brenda M. Simon, The Implications of 
Technological Advancement for Obviousness, 19 Mich. Telecomm. & 
Tech. L. Rev. 331, 333 (2013) (discussing the effects of increased 
access to information and processing power on invention and the ability 
to locate prior art).  
12. Jacob S. Sherkow, Negativing Invention, 2011 BYU L. Rev. 1091, 
1094–95 (2011). 
13. Id. at 1115. 
14. See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 Yale L.J. 2, 20, 
39 (2010) (“By eschewing additional context, the [teaching, suggestion, 
or motivation] test allows district court judges to operate as cognitive 
misers.”). 
15. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 
1987); Sherkow, supra note 12, at 1120. 
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establish obviousness during litigation.16 Courts should make use of 
additional information that arises during litigation to engage in a 
more robust analysis of obviousness. Given that the ultimate 
determination of obviousness is a question of law based on underlying 
facts,17 and examiners often have no formal legal training, courts are 
in a better position to engage in a more thorough analysis.18 
This Article proposes that courts should ground the obviousness 
determination in reality, considering all prior art, regardless of 
whether it is analogous, and shifting the analysis to what actually 
happens in the innovative context. Courts will need to closely 
evaluate the differences between the prior art and the claimed 
invention in determining obviousness.19 Rather than relying on the 
outmoded threshold categorization used in the analogous arts test as a 
shortcut to find inventions obvious, a more robust obviousness 
analysis will ensure the rich examination that the Supreme Court has 
mandated.20 Essentially, courts should be wary of relying too heavily 
on the soft rule–based approach of the analogous arts test. Instead, 
they should engage in the contextually based analysis of 
nonobviousness set forth by the Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.21 
and KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,22 which merely considers 
 
16. See, e.g., In re Portola Packaging, Inc., 110 F.3d 786, 789 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (“[N]ewly-discovered prior art often is identified only after a 
patent is issued because a potential infringer generally has greater 
resources and incentives to search for and find prior art than does the 
[USPTO].”); Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 Vand. 
L. Rev. 115, 178 (2003) (“[P]otential infringers have strong incentives 
to seek out evidence that might undermine a patent’s validity, for 
example by ‘scouring public and private sources around the world’ for 
prior art . . . .”) (citation omitted);  Mark A. Lemley, Rational 
Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1495, 1502 (2001) 
(“In contrast to the eighteen hours an examiner will spend on a patent 
from start to finish, lawyers and technical experts will spend hundreds 
and perhaps even thousands of hours searching for and reading prior art, 
poring over the specification and prosecution history, and preparing and 
defending invalidity arguments.”). 
17. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) (explaining that 
obviousness is a question of law based on underlying factual deter-
minations). 
18. Indeed, the United Kingdom Patent Office did not require an 
examination of obviousness until 1977. Intellectual Property 
Office, Public Consultation on Level of the Inventive Step Required for 
Obtaining Patents—the Government’s Response, http://www.ipo.gov. 
uk/response-inventive.pdf (last visited May 30, 2014). 
19. See id.  
20. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007). 
21. 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
22. 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
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the scope and content of the prior art as one factor in a rich standard. 
This shift will ensure that courts consider all of the relevant factors to 
determine obviousness more accurately. 
The two key inquiries of the analogous arts test, defining the field 
of the invention and the scope of the problem solved by the invention, 
are at the heart of its unpredictability. Part I examines the 
development of the analogous arts test, focusing on how subjectivity 
entered into a test that was supposed to provide greater predictability 
in assessing obviousness. Part I also discusses how transformations in 
the process of innovation should inform the ways in which courts and 
examiners define two central components of the obviousness inquiry: 
(1) the person having ordinary skill in the art (“PHOSITA”), which is 
the hypothetical being from whose perspective the question of 
obviousness is evaluated, and (2) the scope and content of the prior 
art.  
Decision makers should adjust the application of the analogous 
arts test during prosecution and litigation to account for different 
constraints. Part II discusses how the analogous arts test should be 
modified during prosecution—examiners need to reinvigorate the 
PHOSITA in applying the analogous arts test and focus on the claims 
to provide greater certainty. Part III suggests that, during litigation, 
courts should limit their use of the analogous arts test and instead 
return to the heart of the rich contextual Graham standard, 
examining the differences between the claimed invention and the prior 
art, consistent with the Supreme Court’s approach to obviousness.23 
Part IV concludes by responding to objections to the proposal. 
Reducing reliance on the analogous arts test during litigation should 
result in a better assessment of obviousness where it matters most. 
I. The Development of the Analogous Arts Test  
Determining whether an invention is obvious is often the critical 
inquiry of patent law.24 Section 103 of the Patent Act denies patents  
23. Id. at 406. 
24. The struggle with obviousness is not unique to the United States. 
Members of the World Trade Organization are required to grant patents 
for inventions that “are new, involve an inventive step and are capable 
of industrial application.” Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, art. 27, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 
1208. “Inventive step” is defined as being synonymous with “non-
obvious.” Id. at 1208 n.5. See Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its 
Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in India’s 
Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 1571, 1589 (2009) 
(commenting on India’s decision to adopt “an exceptionally high 
threshold for inventive step”); Timo Minssen, Meanwhile on the Other 
Side of the Pond: Why Biopharmaceutical Inventions That Were 
“Obvious to Try” Still Might Be Non-Obvious—Part I, 9 Chi.-Kent J. 
Intell. Prop. 60, 61 (2010) (comparing application of the inventive 
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to inventions if “the differences between the subject matter sought to 
be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a 
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to 
a person having ordinary skill in the art.”25 In evaluating obviousness, 
courts and examiners apply a broad standard using the Graham 
framework, which considers (1) the scope and content of the prior art, 
(2) differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, (3) the 
level of ordinary skill in the art, and (4) secondary considerations of 
nonobviousness, such as commercial success and long-felt but unmet 
need.26 
In assessing obviousness, prior art references can be combined to 
show that all of the elements of the claimed invention are present in 
the prior art. Such combination is permitted when there is a reason 
why a person having ordinary skill in the art would combine them. In 
hindsight, inventions often seem obvious, particularly where prior art 
references contain all the elements of the claimed invention and 
merely need to be combined.27 Having a reason to combine helps 
prevent improper use of hindsight, which is particularly problematic 
given that nonobviousness is determined as of the time of filing, which 
may be many years before a decision maker assesses validity. The 
Federal Circuit previously attempted to avoid the hindsight bias 
problem by adopting a rigid rule, which had required that the prior 
art contain a teaching, suggestion, or motivation (“TSM”) to combine 
the references. In KSR, the Supreme Court rejected the strict 
 
step/obviousness analysis in Europe and the U.S., and suggesting that 
“[p]atent law . . . does not sufficiently relate to the economic and 
scientific reality of pharmaceutical R&D”); Amy Nelson, Obviousness or 
Inventive Step as Applied to Nucleic Acid Molecules: A Global 
Perspective, 6 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 1, 30 (2004) (discussing the main 
differences in obviousness in the United States, Australia, Europe, and 
Japan); Wei-Lin Wang & Jerry I-H Hsiao, The Person Having Ordinary 
Skill in the Arts in Assessing Obviousness Standard in the United States 
and Taiwan After KSR—Implications for Taiwan Patent Law and 
Practice, 38 Rutgers L. Rev. 18 (2010) (discussing uncertainty in the 
application of the PHOSITA standard in assessing inventive step in 
Taiwan). 
25. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). The recently enacted America Invents Act 
changes the timing for assessing obviousness to “before the effective 
filing date of the claimed invention.” Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 
Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 286 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 103). 
26. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).  
27. See Gregory N. Mandel, Another Missed Opportunity: The Supreme 
Court’s Failure to Define Nonobviousness or Combat Hindsight Bias in 
KSR v. Teleflex, 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 323, 324 (2008) 
(discussing the hindsight bias problem). 
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requirement;28 however, the Federal Circuit still considers motivation 
to combine a helpful “clue” in determining obviousness.29 
Despite the Supreme Court’s broad standard for determining 
obviousness set forth in KSR, the Federal Circuit adopted the 
analogous arts test in an attempt to provide a bright-line rule 
addressing the requirements of the nonobviousness statute. To assess 
obviousness, the fact finder must first determine what may be 
considered as prior art, which often asks whether the art is “too 
remote to be treated as prior art.”30 In determining which subject 
matter is pertinent, courts and examiners have relied on the two-part 
analogous arts test, considering: “(1) whether the art is from the same 
field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the 
reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether 
the reference is still reasonably pertinent to the particular problem.”31 
Consequently, the person having ordinary skill in the art is presumed 
to have knowledge of all prior art within the field of endeavor, as well 
as prior art reasonably pertinent to the problem solved by the 
invention.32 The outcome of the analogous arts test is often dispositive 
in analyzing obviousness. 
When Congress first enacted the obviousness statute in 1952, 
placing such limitations on the scope of allowable prior art seemed 
reasonable, given the limitations on finding and retrieving useful 
information at that time.33 In view of the changing nature of 
innovation and increased access to information, these limitations on 
the scope of prior art now seem outmoded, at least during litigation 
where additional resources are available.  
Decision makers have struggled with both parts of the analogous 
arts test, in determining whether a reference is from the same field as 
 
28. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007).  
29. See, e.g., Media Techs. Licensing, L.L.C. v. Upper Deck Co., 596 F.3d 
1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding it would have been obvious to 
attach a piece of memorabilia to a sports-related item instead of 
attaching it to non-sports-related prior art); W. Union Co. v. 
MoneyGram Payment Sys., Inc., 626 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(analyzing motivation to combine and finding the improvement to the 
prior art to be obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art); Ortho-
McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (“[A] flexible TSM test remains the primary guarantor 
against a non-statutory hindsight analysis such as occurred in this 
case.”).  
30. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
31. Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
32. In re Clay, 966 F.2d at 659. 
33. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
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that of the invention or reasonably pertinent to the scope of the 
problem solved by the invention. Adding to its uncertainty, the 
analogous arts test has not kept up with the changing nature of 
innovation. Advances in technology have muddled the definition of 
the PHOSITA and the scope of the prior art—two central factors in 
the determination of obviousness. 
A. Early Attempts to Provide a Bright-Line Rule 
Initially, the analogous arts test attempted to provide a clear rule 
for determining obviousness. The long-standing debate about rules 
and standards highlights the trade-off between providing 
predictability and recognizing creativity.34 Bright-line rules provide 
greater certainty; standards allow for a flexible, contextual 
determination.35 
In formulating the rule for assessing obviousness in 1895, the 
Supreme Court first focused on the importance of the closeness of the 
field of the invention to that of the prior art.36 In Potts v. Creager, 
the Court upheld a patent that transferred the use of a component 
from one industry into a new industry.37 The Court focused on the 
proximity of the industry of the prior art to the new industry of the 
claimed invention, the modifications required to create the claimed 
invention, and the significance of the modifications to the new 
industry in finding the invention nonobvious.38 This construction of 
the analogous arts test allowed decision makers to act as “cognitive 
misers,” focusing on the proximity of the fields, rather than the 
underlying technology.39 
A lack of guidance in the case law about how to define the field of 
invention and problem solved, however, has made the analogous arts 
test unpredictable and highly subjective.40 The Supreme Court  
34. See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 2. 
35. Id. 
36. Potts v. Creager, 155 U.S. 597, 606 (1895). 
37. Id. at 608–09 (finding the inventor’s substitution of glass bars used in 
one industry for steel in the new industry of the invention was not 
merely for the “more perfect accomplishment of the same work” but “for 
a purpose wholly different from that for which they had been 
employed”). 
38. Id. at 606. 
39. See Lee, supra note 14, at 39 (noting how the teaching, suggestion, or 
motivation “test allows district court judges to operate as cognitive 
misers”). 
40. See Margo A. Bagley, Internet Business Model Patents: Obvious by 
Analogy, 7 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 253, 270 (2001) (“[I]t 
is impossible to predict how narrowly or broadly a court will define the 
relevant field of the inventor’s endeavor or the problem to be solved.”); 
Jeffrey T. Burgess, The Analogous Art Test, 7 Buff. Intell. Prop. 
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complicated the analogous arts analysis in the 1966 case of Calmar v. 
Cook Chemical,41 in which it looked beyond the field of the invention 
to the problem that the inventor was trying to solve.42 Shifting the 
focus to the inventor contradicts the requirement that obviousness be 
determined objectively, from the perspective of the PHOSITA. Cook’s 
patent was a pump sprayer for use with insecticide containers.43 The 
Court rejected Cook’s argument that a reference relating to pouring 
spouts for liquid containers was not in the pertinent prior art and 
thus could not be considered in finding its patent obvious.44 Reasoning 
that the problems that Cook and the industry faced were mechanical 
closure problems and not related to insecticides, the Court found that 
closure devices in the liquid container art were pertinent references.45 
The Court of Custom and Patent Appeals set forth the current 
two-part test for analogous arts in its 1979 decision, In re Wood.46 For 
the analogous arts inquiry, a court or examiner must decide (1) 
whether the art is “within the field of the inventor’s endeavor,” and 
(2) if the reference is not within the same field, whether the reference 
is still reasonably pertinent to the particular problem “with which the 
inventor was involved.”47 While easily stated, the analogous arts test 
has become nearly impossible to apply objectively. 
 
L.J. 63, 70 (2009) (“Unfortunately, the case law appears erratic on this 
issue at times.”); Hilary K. Dobies, New Viability in the Doctrine of 
Analogous Art, 34 IDEA 227, 229–30 (1994) (“Characterizing analogous 
art involves a fact specific determination that is by definition, somewhat 
subjective.”); Sherkow, supra note 12, at 1111–12 (“Nor has the Federal 
Circuit been consistent on the proper approach to determining which art 
is analogous on the face of a patent application.”); Toshiko Takenaka, 
International and Comparative Law Perspectives on Internet Patents, 7 
Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 423, 428 (2001) (“[A] serious flaw 
inherent to the doctrine of analogous art is its arbitrary nature of 
defining the applicable scope.”).  
41. 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (decided in conjunction with Graham v. John Deere 
Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966)). 
42. Id. at 35. 
43. Id. at 26. 
44. Id. at 35. 
45. Id. (“The problems confronting Scoggin and the insecticide industry 
were not insecticide problems; they were mechanical closure problems.”).  
46. In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (“The rationale 
behind this rule precluding rejections based on combination of teachings 
of references from nonanalogous arts is the realization that an inventor 
could not possibly be aware of every teaching in every art.”). 
47. Id. 
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B. Subjectivity in Defining the Field and the 
Problem Solved Blurs the Test 
By focusing the inquiry on the problem that the inventor or the 
industry was trying to solve in Cook and Wood, the courts introduced 
considerable uncertainty into the analysis. The subjectivity in defining 
the problem that the inventor was purportedly trying to solve is 
apparent in the 1992 decision of In re Clay.48  
Prior to In re Clay, the analogous arts test generally failed to 
offer patent holders protection, rarely precluding a reference from 
being considered as prior art.49 However, the Federal Circuit 
reinvigorated the use of the analogous arts test in In re Clay.50 Clay 
filed a patent application claiming a process for extracting stored oil 
from the bottom of a tank in which the outlet port was above the 
bottom of the tank.51 Clay’s invention involved filling the gap between 
the tank bottom and the outlet port with a gel.52 The closest prior art 
was the Sydansk reference, which taught injecting gel into rock 
formations to direct oil flow in the ideal direction.53 
In deciding that Sydansk was not analogous art, the Federal 
Circuit used the two-part test, asking (1) whether the art is from the 
same field of endeavor and, if not, (2) “whether the reference still is 
reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the 
inventor is involved.”54 The court again focused improperly on the 
perspective of the inventor, rather than that of the PHOSITA. In 
Clay, the court stated the field of invention was the storage of liquid 
hydrocarbons, while the prior art involved the extraction of 
petroleum, so the first part of the test was not satisfied.55 For the 
second part, the court defined the problem the inventor faced as 
preventing the loss of product while removing oil from man-made 
tanks, while Sydansk was directed to extracting oil from rock.56 
Because the Federal Circuit defined the problem narrowly, the court 
did not find Sydansk was analogous art.57 In light of the differences in 
the conditions between extracting oil from underground as opposed to 
 
48. 966 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
49. See Bagley, supra note 40, at 267. 
50. 966 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
51. Id. at 657. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 659. 
54. Id. (emphasis added). 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 659–60. 
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storage tanks, the court reasoned that a PHOSITA trying to address 
Clay’s problem would not consider oil extraction art.58 
The Federal Circuit’s analysis of both parts of the test highlights 
its subjectivity. For the first inquiry of the “same field,” the court 
easily could have upheld the PTO’s finding that Clay’s invention and 
the Sydansk reference were in the same field of “maximizing 
withdrawal of petroleum stored in petroleum reservoirs.”59 For the 
second prong, the court could have defined the problem facing the 
inventor as maximizing petroleum recovery by filling dead volumes, a 
problem for which the Sydansk reference would have been reasonably 
pertinent. By analyzing both prongs of the test narrowly, the court 
found the reference not analogous, highlighting the substantial 
subjectivity in the analysis. 
That same year, the Federal Circuit again narrowly defined the 
problem to be solved in In re Oetiker.60 The court reversed the PTO’s 
rejection of Oetiker’s application, which concerned assembly line 
metal hose clamps. The examiner had found the metal hose clamp 
invention obvious in light of a reference discussing plastic fasteners 
used in clothing.61 Even though both the invention and the prior art 
reference were clamps, the Federal Circuit reasoned that a PHOSITA, 
trying to solve the problem of fastening an assembly line hose clamp, 
could not have reasonably been expected to examine clothing 
fasteners.62  
The definition of the field and of the problem to be solved 
predestines the obviousness outcome. Had the Federal Circuit defined 
the field broadly as “clamps,” the first part of the analogous arts test 
would have been met; the reference would have come in as analogous 
art, and the application likely found obvious. If the court had defined 
the problem to be solved broadly as a “hooking problem,” the clothing 
fasteners likely would have been reasonably pertinent, and the 
application likely found obvious. Unlike Calamar, in which the Court 
criticized the PTO’s narrow definition of the problem solved as 
limited to “insecticides” and expanded it to “mechanical closure 
problems,” the Federal Circuit in Oetiker narrowly defined the 
problem, excluding the prior art reference from consideration, and the 
obviousness rejection was reversed.63 
Adding to the confusion of the doctrine, the Federal Circuit 
broadly defined the problem to be solved five years later in In re 
 
58. Id. at 660. 
59. Id. at 659. 
60. 977 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
61. Id. at 1446. 
62. Id. at 1447. 
63. See Bagley, supra note 40, at 270. 
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Schreiber.64 The whimsical invention at issue involved conical shaped 
tops for popcorn shakers.65 The court found conical shaped ends for oil 
cans reasonably pertinent, although they are from different fields of 
endeavor.66 The conical oil can top would be reasonably pertinent to 
the problem of dispensing kernels of popcorn “at the same time,” 
while using the tapered top to “jam up the popped popcorn” and 
allow “only a few kernels” to pass through.67 By defining the problem 
broadly, the obviousness analysis of an invention related to popcorn 
dispensers can encompass prior art oil can references.  
Similarly, in 2004, the Federal Circuit broadly defined the field of 
invention in In re Bigio.68 There, the PTO struck down the claim at 
issue covering a hairbrush in view of three references discussing 
toothbrushes.69 The Federal Circuit agreed with the PTO’s rejection, 
reasoning that the invention could cover brushes for any type of body 
hair, including facial hair.70 It noted that the PTO had correctly set 
forth the structural similarities between toothbrushes and small 
hairbrushes, as well as the functional similarities between the two 
types of brushes, in that a toothbrush could be used for brushing 
facial hair.71 Consequently, the Federal Circuit concluded that the 
references concerning toothbrushes were analogous to the claimed 
hairbrushes.72 Judge Newman strongly dissented, stating that a “brush 
for hair has no more relation to a brush for teeth than does hair 
resemble teeth.”73  
 
64. 128 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
65. Id. at 1474. 
66. Id. at 1478. 
67. Id. See also In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding 
lids used in a cabinet, telephone directory, and piano to be reasonably 
pertinent to the “clamshell style” opening configuration used in a laptop 
computer). 
68. 381 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
69. Id. at 1326. The claim at issue involved a hairbrush with a unique shape 
in which the bristles and the bristle substrate were in an hourglass 
arrangement. 
70. Id. at 1325. 
71. Id. at 1326 (noting that the prior art “toothbrush may easily be used for 
brushing hair (e.g., human facial hair) in view of the size of the bristle 
segment and arrangement of the bristle bundles described in the 
reference”). 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 1327 (“The mode and mechanics of brushing teeth cannot 
reasonably be viewed as analogous to the mode and mechanics of 
brushing hair.”). 
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The ambiguity in application of the analogous arts test has been 
amplified with the expansive use of the test in light of recent case 
law, particularly because the definition of the field of the inventor’s 
endeavor and the problem to be solved are often dispositive to the 
obviousness question.74 
C. Technological Advancement Adds to the Uncertainty 
Complicating an already fuzzy rule, transformations in the process 
of innovation have broadened the scope of art considered analogous. 
Even back in 1966, the Supreme Court in Graham realized that “the 
ambit of applicable art in given fields of science has widened by 
disciplines unheard of a half century ago. . . . [T]hose persons granted 
the benefit of a patent monopoly [must] be charged with an awareness 
of these changed conditions.”75  
In the 2007 decision of KSR v. Teleflex, the Supreme Court 
implicitly recognized that increased interdisciplinary research and 
access to searchable information should inform how courts and 
examiners define the person having ordinary skill in the art 
(PHOSITA), as well as the scope and content of prior art.76 Almost 
fifty years after the Court’s recognition in Graham of the implications 
technological advancement can have for obviousness, it is still not 
clear to what extent those having ordinary skill in the art can 
integrate “the ambit of applicable art.”77  
Access to searchable information and increased processing 
capabilities have changed the process of research, potentially 
implicating what it means to be obvious. Information can be obtained, 
and perhaps analyzed, more efficiently.78 Technologies like idea 
 
74. Bagley, supra note 40, at 270 (“How broadly or narrowly the field of the 
inventor’s endeavor or the problem facing the inventor is defined largely 
determines what art is analogous, which in turn plays a significant role 
in the determination of whether an invention will be deemed obvious.”); 
Sherkow, supra note 12, at 1115 (“[T]he broader the analogous art, the 
greater number of prior art references that can potentially be held 
against the inventor, and the more likely that the patent will be found 
invalid as obvious.”). 
75. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 19 (1966). 
76. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418–22 (2007); Simon, 
supra note 11, at 333–34 (discussing technological advancement in the 
areas of information retrieval and processing capability). 
77. Graham, 383 U.S. at 19. 
78. See Matthew W.G. Dye et al., Increasing Speed of Processing with 
Action Video Games, 18 Current Directions in Psychol. Sci., 321, 
321 (2009) (“Video gaming may therefore provide an efficient training 
regimen to induce a general speeding of perceptual reaction times 
without decreases in accuracy of performance.”); C. Shawn Green & 
Daphne Bavelier, Action Video Game Modifies Visual Selective 
Attention, 423 Nature 534 (2003) (demonstrating that habitual players 
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stimulation programs, computer-aided thinking software, and three-
dimensional printing may all speed up the innovative process.79 Mere 
access to information, however, does not necessarily mean the 
PHOSITA will have the time or inclination to appreciate its 
significance.80 Despite this disconnect, courts often use the analogous 
arts test in a way that assumes access to information is the same 
thing as understanding it, finding inventions obvious as a natural 
consequence of concluding that the prior art reference at issue is 
analogous. 
 
of action video games, as well as non–video game players trained on 
action video games, show improved visual selective attention); Gary W. 
Small et al., Your Brain on Google: Patterns of Cerebral Activation 
During Internet Searching, 17 Am. J. Geriatric Psychiatry 116 
(2009) (demonstrating that Internet users showed increased neural 
activity); Matt Richtel, Hooked on Gadgets, and Paying a Mental Price, 
N.Y. Times, June 7, 2010, at A12 (“Technology use can benefit the 
brain in some ways . . . .”). 
79. See John Bohannon, Searching for the Google Effect on People’s 
Memory, 333 Sci. 277 (2011) (discussing whether “[o]ur increasingly 
information-rich environment” could be a factor in “the gradual increase 
in IQ scores observed over the past century”); David Pressman, 
Patent It Yourself: Your Step-by-Step Guide to Filing at the 
U.S. Patent Office 39–42 (Richard Stim ed., 15th ed. 2011) 
(“[C]omputers can be used to enhance creativity, solve problems, bust 
through conceptual roadblocks, and get into the recesses of your 
memory.”); Print Me a Stradivarius, Economist, Feb. 12, 2011,  
http://www.economist.com/node/18114327. 
80. See, e.g., David C. Blair & M. E. Maron, An Evaluation of Retrieval 
Effectiveness for a Full-Text Document-Retrieval System, 28 Comm. 
ACM 289, 295 (1985) (describing how users of full-text database 
believed they were retrieving 75% of the relevant documents when they 
were only retrieving 20%, highlighting the flawed “assumption that it is 
a simple matter for users to foresee the exact words and phrases that 
will be used in the documents they will find useful, and only in those 
documents”); Nicholas Carr, Is Google Making Us Stupid?, Atlantic, 
July/August 2008, at 56, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive 
/2008/07/is-google-making-us-stupid/6868/ (questioning whether access 
to technology will make innovation easier); Toru Ishikawa et al., 
Wayfinding with a GPS-Based Mobile Navigation System: A 
Comparison with Maps and Direct Experience, 28 J. Envtl. Psychol. 
74, 80–81 (2008) (comparing wayfinding behavior and showing GPS 
users traveled more slowly, made more stops, and traveled longer 
distances than those who relied on maps or navigated based on direct 
experience); Simon, supra note 11, at 342–45 (discussing how advances 
in technology may impact innovation); Betsy Sparrow et al., Google 
Effects on Memory: Cognitive Consequences of Having Information at 
Our Fingertips, 333 Sci. 776, 776–78 (2011) (describing four 
experiments that suggest the “processes of human memory are adapting 
to the advent of new computing and communication technology”). 
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1. The New and Improved Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art 
Obviousness is determined not from the perspective of an 
examiner, jury, or judge, but rather from that of the PHOSITA, 
further complicating the analysis. To satisfy the requirements of 
Section 103, the invention must not be obvious to the PHOSITA at 
the time it was made.81 
Traditionally, the PHOSITA was considered to be a “very boring 
. . . nerd”: someone having the ability to access all pertinent 
information without any way to integrate it.82 In 1966, the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals described the PHOSITA as “working in 
his shop with the prior art references—which he is presumed to 
know—hanging on the walls around him.”83 Given the increased 
access to searchable information made available through advances in 
technology, Winslow’s prior art wallpaper has moved from theoretical 
to actual. 
The Supreme Court in KSR recognized this expansion, redefining 
the PHOSITA as a person having not merely ordinary skill, but also 
creativity and common sense.84 The invention claimed in KSR 
concerned an adjustable gas pedal connected to a fixed sensor for use 
in computer-controlled systems in cars.85 The prior art discussed 
adjustable gas pedals as well as modular sensors, though nobody 
combined them before the inventor in KSR.86 In deciding that it  
81. 35 U.S.C § 103 (2006). The recently enacted America Invents Act 
changes the timing of the obviousness inquiry to “before the effective 
filing date of the claimed invention.” Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 
Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 286 (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. § 103 (2012)). 
82. Sandoz GmbH v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, [2004] EWHC (Ch) 1313. 
See also Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987) (“[T]he decisionmaker confronts a ghost, i.e., ‘a person having 
ordinary skill in the art,’ not unlike the ‘reasonable man’ and other 
ghosts in the law.”); Jonathan J. Darrow, The Neglected Dimension of 
Patent Law’s PHOSITA Standard, 23 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 227, 235 
n.38 (2009) (“The PHOSITA standard has been likened to the 
reasonable person standard in tort law.”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of 
PHOSITA, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 885, 888 (2004) (suggesting that 
courts refocus on “the statutory directive that judgments of 
nonobviousness be made from the perspective of PHOSITA”); Joseph P. 
Meara, Just Who Is the Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art? 
Patent Law’s Mysterious Personage, 77 Wash. L. Rev. 267, 267 (2002) 
(“Patent law’s ‘person having ordinary skill in the art’ (Phosita) has 
been likened to the reasonable person of tort law.” (citation omitted)). 
83. In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966). 
84. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007). 
85. Id. at 406. 
86. Id. at 408–09. 
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would have been obvious for a PHOSITA to combine the prior art 
references, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s rigid requirement 
that the prior art contain a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to 
combine the references. Instead, the Court advanced a “common 
sense” methodology of deciding obviousness in light “of the inferences 
and creative steps that a [PHOSITA] would employ.”87  
A PHOSITA blessed with creativity and common sense, having 
access to searchable information, could combine virtually all prior art 
references, even those from widely divergent fields. This runs the risk 
of raising the nonobviousness bar too high, as a PHOSITA is deemed 
to be aware of even hidden or extremely remote prior art.88  
To accurately determine the common sense and creativity of the 
PHOSITA, this Article proposes that decision makers should shift the 
focus, not merely to analyze the information that the PHOSITA could 
access in the same field or as reasonably pertinent to the problem 
solved by the invention, but instead to assess whether the PHOSITA 
would recognize and understand interdisciplinary advances in different 
technological fields, given limitations on time and interest. A 
PHOSITA defined as a research entity, rather than an individual, 
may be more likely to consider a larger range of prior art. Even where 
advances in technology free up time for innovation, reduce the costs 
of obtaining information, and facilitate collaboration, these advances 
do not necessarily make an invention obvious.89 The mere availability 
of information does not mean that those of ordinary skill in the art 
would have time or inclination to review a given reference. This 
analysis, long overlooked in the discussion of analogous arts, should 
take place in evaluating the obviousness of the invention, taking into 
account the differences between the prior art and the claimed 
invention, as Graham requires.  
 
87. Id. at 418. 
88. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[A]ll prior art 
references in the field of the invention are available to this hypothetical 
skilled artisan.”). See also Alan Devlin, Revisiting the Presumption of 
Patent Validity, 37 Sw. U. L. Rev. 323, 342 (2008) (“[T]here is little, if 
any, long-term social value associated with invalidating patents on the 
basis of prior art not within the realistic purview of the inventor . . . .”); 
Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the 
Obviousness of Inventions, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 989, 1016 (2008) 
(“Much of that art is obscure enough that, in the real world, the 
PHOSITA wouldn’t have access to it and likely wouldn’t know about 
it.”). 
89. Simon, supra note 11, at 366–67. 
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2. Technological Advancement and the Continued Viability 
of the Analogous Arts Test 
In light of advances in information technology and the decision in 
KSR, the rationale for limiting consideration of references using the 
analogous arts test as a bright-line rule seemed questionable. After all, 
the Court had criticized strict tests of obviousness in KSR, concluding 
that “courts and patent examiners should [not] look only to the 
problem the patentee was trying to solve.”90 The viability of the 
analogous arts test became uncertain.  
It remained so until the 2011 decision in In re Klein,91 in which 
the Federal Circuit ensured the continued importance of the test as a 
way to limit the scope of prior art considered in determining 
obviousness. Klein claimed a nectar mixing device with a movable 
divider that allows users to prepare sugar water in varying ratios.92 
The Federal Circuit held on appeal that the references at issue could 
not be considered; they were not analogous art.93 Three references did 
not show a container that could receive water or hold it long enough 
to make the mixture.94 The remaining references did not have 
movable dividers and could not permit multiple ratios.95 
The court also rejected the PTO’s efforts to expand the definition 
of the problem solved from a “nectar mixing device” to a 
“compartment separation problem.”96 The PTO’s attempt to redefine 
the problem solved highlights the subjectivity in the analogous arts 
test, as the obviousness outcome often depends on how expansively 
the problem is defined. Defining the problem as dealing with 
“compartment separation”97 expands the scope of art that can be 
considered, and the invention will more likely be found invalid.  
 
90. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007); see also 
Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(finding prior art involving the cooling of computer electronics using 
fans to draw cool ambient air was in the same field as claimed cooling 
devices for mounting in a computer drive bay); In re ICON Health & 
Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding folding bed’s 
spring mechanism analogous to claimed folding treadmill, as the folding 
mechanism of the claimed invention generally addressed a weight 
support problem). 
91. 647 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
92. Id. at 1345. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 1348–50. 
95. Id. at 1350–52. 
96. Id. at 1352 n.2. 
97. Id. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 1·2014 
Rules, Standards, and the Reality of Obviousness 
43 
Much as it did in the years prior to KSR, the Federal Circuit 
continued to apply the analogous arts test without providing clear 
guidelines. In a second case from 2011 concerning the analogous arts 
test, Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entertainment, Inc.,98 the 
Federal Circuit went so far as to consider the teachings of the prior 
art in assessing “the problem [faced by] an inventor.”99 The claimed 
invention in Innovention Toys concerns a physical, light-reflecting 
board game.100 It uses laser sources, and both mirrored and non-
mirrored playing pieces.101 The prior art included electronic computer 
games, rather than physical board games.102 The Federal Circuit found 
that the district court erred when it failed to consider whether the 
prior art references were “reasonably pertinent to the problem facing 
an inventor of a new, physical, laser-based strategy game.”103 The 
focus should not be on the inventor; the obviousness determination 
should be made from the perspective of the PHOSITA. 
The Federal Circuit further obscured the analogous arts 
determination in its 2012 decision in K-Tec, Inc. v. Vita-Mix Corp.104 
This case involved commercial blenders for making frozen drinks.105 K-
Tec received patents involving a blending jar geometry that would 
address the problem of a pocket of air created around a spinning 
blade, known as cavitation.106 The claims at issue discussed “four side 
walls” and “a fifth truncated wall disposed between two of the four 
side walls.”107 Alleged infringer Vita-Mix argued that non-blender 
designs using five-sided containers should have been deemed 
 
98. 637 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
99. Id. at 1321–22. 
100. Id. at 1316. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 1321–22. 
103. Id. (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit reasoned that because the 
prior art mentioned potentially carrying out the game in both electronic 
and physical form, the references would be from analogous arts. 
Specifically, the prior art references and the patent related to the same 
objective—“game design, and game elements” in strategy games—
“whether molded in plastic by a mechanical engineer or coded in 
software by a computer scientist.” Consequently, the Federal Circuit 
held that the creators of the patented board games should have 
considered the teachings of the video game references in addressing the 
problem of constructing a board game using lasers. Id. at 1322–23. 
104. 696 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
105. Id. at 1368. 
106. Id. at 1368–69.  
107. Id. at 1368.  
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analogous art and therefore considered by the jury in determining 
obviousness.108 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary 
judgment that the prior art references were not analogous, again 
focusing on the second prong of the test examining reasonable 
pertinence.109 Vita-Mix’s expert failed to “explain any rational 
underpinning for [the inventor] to have consulted non-blending 
containers or food mixers in order to solve the problems he 
encountered in designing a new blending container.”110 Here, as in 
Innovention Toys, the Federal Circuit gave undue weight to the 
problems of the inventor in deciding reasonable pertinence, asking 
whether the reference “logically would have commended itself to an 
inventor’s attention in considering his problem.”111 Instead, the court 
should have focused on the PHOSITA, as required by the Supreme 
Court in Graham and KSR. 
Some have suggested that by limiting the ability to rely on the 
teaching, suggestion, or motivation test, KSR reinvigorated use of the 
analogous arts test as a way to avoid hindsight bias.112 Yet, the 
analogous arts test permits courts too much subjectivity in its 
application, in defining both the field of invention and whether a 
reference is reasonably pertinent to the problem solved, short-
circuiting the fact-intensive analysis advanced by the Supreme Court. 
The analogous arts test, at best, provides a soft rule focusing on 
outdated considerations. 
II. Obviousness During Prosecution: The Analogous 
Arts Test as a Cost-Effective Tool 
Even imperfect rules have benefits. During prosecution, the 
analogous arts test provides a cost-effective way for examiners to 
determine obviousness. Examiners often operate under significant time 
and resource constraints.113 These limitations are acutely felt, given 
 
108. Id. at 1374. 
109. Id. at 1375. 
110. Id. (quoting K-TEC, Inc. v. Vita-Mix Corp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1324 
(D. Utah 2010)). 
111. K-Tec, Inc. v. Vita-Mix Corp., 696 F.3d at 1375 (emphasis added) 
(quoting Innovention Toys, L.L.C. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 
1321 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). 
112. See, e.g., Theresa Stadheim, How KSR v. Teleflex Will Affect Patent 
Prosecution in the Electrical and Mechanical Arts, 91 J. Pat. & 
Trademark Off. Soc’y 142, 151 (2009) (“After KSR, the test for 
analogous art is much broader.”). 
113. See, e.g., Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 1, at 53 (noting that 
examiners generally spend about sixteen to seventeen hours over three 
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the highly contextual nature of the obviousness determination 
mandated post-KSR.114 Initially, the analogous arts test served as a 
way to guard against hindsight combinations of references that 
decision makers would not expect a PHOSITA to consider. 
Accounting for the hindsight bias problem is all the more important 
in view of technological advancement, as access to information and 
increased processing capability broadens the scope of materials 
available to inventors.115 The question then becomes whether the 
analogous arts test is still useful to address hindsight bias and, if so, 
under what circumstances. 
Although flawed, the analogous arts test provides a simple way 
for examiners to cabin the scope of prior art. Examiners are assigned 
applications, in part, based on the relationship between the 
technological area of the patent application and their technological 
backgrounds.116 They are “presumed to ‘have some expertise in 
interpreting the [prior art] references and to be familiar from their 
work with the level of skill in the art.’”117 Given their backgrounds, 
examiners are similar to the PHOSITA, having some understanding of 
how to define the field of the invention and whether a reference is 
reasonably pertinent to the problem addressed by the patent.118 
The analogous arts test, with all its shortcomings, enables 
examiners to simulate the perspective of the PHOSITA without 
having to provide the intensive evidence that might otherwise be 
required if they had to prove actual practices in the field.119 Of course, 
requiring examiners to prove what actually happens in a given field 
would result in a more accurate assessment of the scope and content  
to four years searching for, assessing, and applying the prior art to the 
claimed invention). 
114. See Lee, supra note 14, at 46 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s new standards 
compel decisionmakers to engage in multifactored examinations of 
inventions and their technological context.”). 
115. See Simon, supra note 11. 
116. E.g., Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 1, at 53 (“Patent examiners who 
are assigned to evaluate those applications are chosen, in part, because 
they have backgrounds roughly related to the technology at hand, but 
examiners are rarely experts on the precise details of the relevant 
invention.”). 
117. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (citations omitted). 
118. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-
Specific?, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1155, 1187–88 (2002) (“But courts 
walk a fine line between taking the skill of an examiner or other artisan 
as probative evidence of the level of skill in the art and equating the 
skill of such persons with the characteristics of the hypothetical 
PHOSITA.”).  
119. Id. at 1188. 
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of the prior art. Doing so, however, would be costly and time 
consuming, hindering the already resource-strapped endeavor that is 
prosecution. Requiring detailed support from examiners applying the 
analogous arts test seems all the more wasteful, as many patents are 
never asserted or licensed, perhaps because the technologies they 
cover never emerge or are not that valuable,120 or because the market 
evolves in an unanticipated way.121 
A. Clarifying Whose Problem It Is 
Even though the analogous arts test may have a place in 
prosecution, a major flaw with its second prong should be corrected 
before both the PTO and courts. As the Federal Circuit stated in 
Bigio, “the majority of the case law precedent for analogous arts 
hinges on the second test,”122 which asks whether a reference “is 
reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the 
inventor is involved.”123 In defining the problem at issue, decision 
makers have been all over the map, discussing problems of the 
inventor,124 the industry with which the inventor is involved,125 and 
the prior art references in question.126 The PTO currently instructs 
examiners to “consider the problem faced by the inventor, as 
reflected—either explicitly or implicitly—in the specification.”127 Yet, 
the obviousness analysis, consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
guidance in Graham and KSR, should be assessed from the objective 
perspective of the PHOSITA.  
Unless the standard for obviousness is changed so that it is 
ascertained from the perspective of a reasonable inventor, rather than 
the PHOSITA, focusing on the problem that the inventor was trying 
to solve makes the inquiry too subjective and misguided. The courts 
 
120. Many patents only cover inventions of minimal value or would not 
withstand a validity challenge during litigation. See John R. Allison & 
Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated 
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (concluding that almost 50% 
of litigated patents are found invalid). 
121. Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 1, at 48; see Lemley, supra note 16. 
122. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
123. Id. at 1325. 
124. Calmar Inc. v. Cook Chem. Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (decided with 
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966)). 
125. Id. 
126. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (asking whether a prior 
art reference “logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s 
attention in considering his problem”) (emphasis added). 
127. USPTO, Memorandum: Analogous Arts for Obviousness Rejections 
(July 26, 2011), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/analogous_ 
art.pdf.  
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have carefully distinguished the inventor from the PHOSITA. The 
PHOSITA possesses ordinary skill, whereas the inventor has 
extraordinary abilities.128 Courts should not “conflate [highly skilled] 
scientists with those of ordinary skill in the art.”129  
B. Discounting Difficult-to-Access Art During Patent 
Prosecution to Increase Predictability 
In light of the distinction between the PHOSITA and the 
inventor, it seems odd for examiners to include hidden or secret prior 
art that neither the inventor nor those of ordinary skill would have 
been able to access as part of the scope of relevant prior art in 
assessing obviousness.130 The classic example, an obscure publication 
that has been indexed by subject, even if not widely disseminated, can 
be considered in assessing obviousness.131 Additionally, prior art that 
the PHOSITA could not have discovered, such as pending patent 
applications that were not yet published at the time of invention, may 
also be included as analogous art.132 Allowing consideration of 
difficult-to-access prior art seems to transform the PHOSITA into a 
vastly more knowledgeable being than even the inventor. 
One reason for allowing consideration of such difficult-to-discover 
art, however, may be that the reference reflects the state of the art. 
That is, even if the publication or the application itself were not 
practicably available for the PHOSITA to access, these obscure 
documents may represent understanding in the field, even if that 
knowledge is not documented in a widely distributed way. Although 
inventors may not have been able to learn about the innovation of  
128. Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (“Inventors . . . possess something—call it what you will—which 
sets them apart from the workers of ordinary skill . . . .”); Kimberly-
Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(“[C]ourts never have judged patentability by what the real 
inventor/applicant/patentee could or would do.”); Durie & Lemley, 
supra note 88, at 993 (“[T]he inventor is presumptively a person of 
extraordinary insight or skill.”). 
129. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 619 F.3d 1329, 1340 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010). 
130. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Devlin, supra note 
88, at 342–44; Durie & Lemley, supra note 88, at 1016–18. See also 
Nelson, supra note 24, at 30 (noting that neither Europe nor Japan 
allows for consideration of secret prior art in evaluating obviousness). 
131. See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (discussing public 
accessibility requirement). See also Constant v. Advanced Micro-
Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[D]issemination 
and public accessibility are the keys to the legal determination whether 
a prior art reference was published.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
132. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(e), (g) (2011). 
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others through a patent application that has not been published,133 for 
example, the existence of a patent may permit dissemination through 
other mechanisms that inventors do access.134  
While such an argument about the state of the art resonates with 
regard to novelty, where the patent system seeks to reward only new 
invention, the reasoning does not translate directly to nonobviousness. 
In many circumstances, the invention builds on what came before it. 
Consequently, denying patents for distinct variations on knowledge 
that is not truly public seems to raise the nonobviousness bar too 
high. The examiner becomes akin to an exceptional PHOSITA, one 
that has access to information that even those of ordinary skill in the 
art cannot find in common practice.  
By focusing the obviousness analysis on practicably accessible 
prior art during prosecution and viewing any hidden art with 
skepticism, the examiner’s determination is more grounded in reality. 
Specifically, the examiner does not have the time or resources during 
prosecution to assess whether a hidden reference reflects 
understanding in the art at the time of invention. Additionally, 
examiners lack formal legal training. Because the ultimate conclusion 
 
133. Additionally, inventors may be reluctant to review accessible patents 
out of fear of becoming willful infringers. See In re Seagate Tech., 
L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (discussing 
willful infringement); Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of 
Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 401, 404 (2010) 
(discussing how the possibility of enhanced damages “creates perverse 
incentives to remain ignorant of patented technology”); Timothy R. 
Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. Rev. 123, 142 (2006) 
(“Given the risk of enhanced damages, a competitor has a significant 
incentive not to review patents at all.”); Benjamin Roin, Note, The 
Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 Harv. 
L. Rev. 2007, 2017 (2005) (“[M]any innovators now avoid reading 
patents to protect themselves from treble damage awards in 
infringement suits.”). 
134. See Lemley, supra note 10, at 747 (“[T]he patent . . . induce[s] the 
communication of that information by other means.”); Lisa Larrimore 
Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 Harv. J.L. & 
Tech. 545, 559 (2012) (“[M]any companies . . . advise researchers to 
avoid reading patents and to look elsewhere for technical information.”). 
But see Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: 
Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 803, 808 n.9 
(1988) (“There is a significant amount of evidence showing that 
inventors in many fields rely on published patents for technical 
information.”). 
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about obviousness is a question of law based on underlying facts,135 
courts are in a better position to engage in a more robust analysis.136 
III. Obviousness During Litigation: Using a Standards-
Based Approach When It Matters  
Courts have used the analogous arts test as a shortcut for finding 
inventions obvious. Instead of engaging in the rich, contextual 
analysis that the obviousness evaluation requires, courts have used 
the analogous arts test as a way to approve complex inventions and 
exclude those that are more straightforward, even if the inventions 
are not obvious.137 Consequently, the analogous arts test provides a 
way for courts to consider the difficulty of the work of invention, 
despite the statutory requirement that “[p]atentability shall not be 
negated by the manner in which the invention was made.”138 The 
shortcomings of the analogous arts test might be overlooked during 
the time-crunched determination of obviousness during prosecution, 
particularly since examiners are often matched with patent 
applications in light of their technological expertise; however, courts 
should be held to higher standards. 
Perhaps worse than its subjectivity, the analogous arts test is 
outdated. The nature of innovation has changed. Inventors often work 
in teams, across multiple disciplines, and consider a broad range of 
references given increased access to searchable information.139 In light  
135. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) (defining 
obviousness as a legal question based on underlying factual 
determinations). 
136. See infra Part III.B. Historically, other international jurisdictions have 
taken a similar approach to limiting the obviousness determination 
during prosecution. For example, the United Kingdom Patent Office did 
not require an examination of obviousness until 1977. Intellectual 
Property Office, supra note 18. 
137. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 
1987). 
138. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 
(2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012)); Sherkow, supra note 12, at 
1120–21 (noting that the “byproduct of increased analogization has 
contained an inherent method-of-invention bias”). 
139. See Lemley, supra note 10, at 750 (“Invention is a social phenomenon, 
not one driven by lone geniuses.”); see also Janet Davidson & Nicole 
Greenberg, Psychologists’ Views on Nonobviousness: Are They 
Obvious?, 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 527, 538 (2008) (“Even though 
innovations can and do occur when people are alone, the preparation, 
evaluation, and elaboration stages surrounding them typically depend 
upon interaction with, and input from, one’s colleagues.”); Gregory N. 
Mandel, Left-Brain Versus Right-Brain: Competing Conceptions of 
Creativity in Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 283, 
349 (2010) (“Collaboration has become both more common and more 
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of these changes, courts have expansively defined the scope of 
analogous arts, yet it is not clear that the included references would 
have been appreciated by those of ordinary skill at the time of 
invention.140 Once art is defined as analogous, the decision maker 
usually finds an invention obvious in light of it.141  
To address the deficiencies in the analogous arts test, courts 
should consider all prior art, regardless of whether it satisfies the 
analogous arts test, in assessing obviousness. Instead of placing too 
much weight on the highly subjective conclusion that a reference is 
from the “same field” as that of the invention, or that a reference is 
“reasonably pertinent” to the problem the inventor was trying to 
solve, this Article proposes that courts should shift the focus to 
evaluating the differences between the prior art and the claimed 
invention in assessing obviousness. Rather than using the analogous 
arts test as a heuristic for finding inventions obvious, courts should 
evaluate whether the PHOSITA would consider the invention as 
claimed in the patent obvious in light of all of the references. By 
examining the differences between the claimed invention and the prior 
art in a more complete manner, courts will better implement the 
Supreme Court’s guidance in KSR about assessing obviousness.142  
During litigation, when more time and resources can be spent on 
the obviousness assessment, courts will be in a better position to 
determine whether common practices support consideration of the 
prior art in question. Judges, unlike examiners, often lack the 
technological background that would help them understand the 
PHOSITA’s perspective. In light of this difference, judges should not 
be relying on common sense or using the analogous arts test as a 
quick way to resolve obviousness. Instead, courts should return to a 
standards-based analysis and take evidence from those in the field,  
necessary across numerous technological and artistic fields.”); R. Keith 
Sawyer, Creativity, Innovation, and Obviousness, 12 Lewis & Clark L. 
Rev. 461, 482 (2008) (“[I]nnovation has become more and more 
dependent on collaborative webs, and on networks of many ideas.”). 
140. See Sherkow, supra note 12. 
141. Id. at 1115. 
142. In the longstanding debate of rules versus standards, one of the 
arguments for choosing rules is less persuasive in this context. In 
particular, sometimes rules are preferable because of concerns that 
decision makers will use their discretion inconsistently with the 
principles of the rule-making body. Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and 
Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 Wisc. L. Rev. 1353, 1400 
n.240 (citing Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685, 1688 (1976)). In patent law, 
however, the normative values of utilitarianism generally direct the 
analysis of the decision maker. Id. (citing Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs 
and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 23, 59 (2001)).   
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including reviewing contemporaneous prior art, declarations, 
testimony, and other information about common practices in assessing 
obviousness.  
A. Solving the Problem to Be Solved  
The question of obviousness should not be focused on the inventor 
or the industry but rather on the differences between the prior art 
and the invention, as claimed in the patent, from the perspective of 
the PHOSITA. The claims of the patent set forth the scope of the 
right to exclude;143 they should be the focus in assessing obviousness 
during litigation.  
Unlike determining the problem the industry or the inventor was 
trying to solve at the time of filing, which raises evidentiary 
challenges, the claims are generally fixed at the time of issuance. By 
focusing on the claims, rather than the problem that the inventor or 
industry was attempting to solve in the past, the analysis of the prior 
art will become more objective and predictable. To address the 
subjectivity inherent in defining the problem to be solved, the focus 
instead should be on common practices—whether PHOSITAs would 
have had the time and inclination to review the references, 
considering the invention as defined by the claims of the patent, and 
whether the invention is obvious in light of them.  
As an example, consider an inventor who files a patent 
application for a stent used to prevent a blood vessel from re-
narrowing.144 A third party submits a reference that discusses the use 
of scaffolding to prevent collapse of highway tunnels. Under the 
proposal, the examiner can use the analogous arts test in assessing 
obviousness, though he or she should focus on the claims and emulate 
the perspective of the PHOSITA. The examiner would likely conclude 
that the PHOSITA would not have found the highway scaffolding 
reference reasonably pertinent to the problem of preventing re-
narrowing of a blood vessel, and the invention likely would not be 
held obvious.  
Under the existing analogous arts doctrine, a court might 
conclude that a similar scaffolding reference presented during 
litigation was reasonably pertinent to the support problem, using the 
court’s “common sense.” Although the scaffolding reference is clearly 
not from the same field as the stent, the court might conclude that 
the scaffolding reference is reasonably pertinent to the problem 
 
143. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
144. “A stent is a small mesh tube,” usually made of metal or fabric, “used 
to treat narrow or weak arteries.” Nat’l Heart, Lung, & Blood Inst., 
What Is a Stent, http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics 
/stents/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2014). 
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solved, namely preventing narrowing of an exterior structure through 
the use of inner support.  
If the proposal set forth in this Article were followed, instead of 
focusing on the analogous arts test, the court would consider the 
differences between the prior art and the claims, which would limit 
the use of the stent to blood vessels. Moreover, after hearing 
testimony from experts and reviewing references contemporaneous 
with the patent application, the court would likely conclude that the 
PHOSITA, consistent with common practices, would not have 
appreciated the significance of the scaffolding reference. That is, the 
scaffolding reference is simply too different from the claimed stent 
invention to render it obvious.  
Or, consider how this proposal would have been applied in one of 
the recent cases discussed previously, the Federal Circuit’s 2012 
decision in K-Tec v. Vita-Mix.145 Recall that the patent at issue 
concerned blenders for making frozen drinks, claiming a blending jar 
shape that would prevent the creation of a pocket of air around a 
spinning blade.146 The prior art references in question disclosed non-
blender designs.147 The Federal Circuit incorrectly focused on the 
inventor, criticizing the alleged infringer for failing to show why the 
inventor would “have consulted nonblending containers or food mixers 
in order to solve the problems he encountered in designing a new 
blending container.”148 Instead, the court should have focused on what 
the PHOSITA would have considered. 
Under the proposal, during prosecution the examiner could 
conclude that the references were not pertinent using the analogous 
arts test, and the invention would likely be found nonobvious. During 
litigation, however, the court should consider the differences between 
the claimed invention and all of the references in evaluating 
obviousness. The claims at issue in this case require a “blender jar.”149 
Consequently, the court would assess whether the PHOSITA, 
consistent with ordinary practices in the art evidenced by expert 
testimony, declarations, and contemporaneous publications, would 
have considered the claimed blender jar obvious in light of the 
references dealing with non-blending containers or mixers.  
 
145. K-Tec, Inc. v. Vita-Mix Corp., 696 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
146. Id. at 1368. 
147. Id. at 1375. 
148. Id. (emphasis added). 
149. Id. at 1368; U.S. Patent No. 7,281,842 (filed Dec. 26, 2005). Given that 
each patent provides protection for one invention, however, perhaps 
courts and examiners should look to the broadest claim in determining 
the problem solved. 
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B. Considering Difficult-to-Locate Prior Art 
As discussed, the proposal instructs examiners to discount hidden 
or secret prior art in assessing obviousness during prosecution, as such 
art is not practicably available to the PHOSITA. This skepticism of 
difficult-to-access art recognizes the constraints of prosecution, as 
examiners generally lack the expertise, time, and resources to assess 
whether a difficult-to-access reference reflects understanding in the art 
at the time of invention.  
During litigation, however, courts and litigants have the time and 
resources to conduct the in-depth analysis that examiners may not.150 
Although hidden or secret prior art may not be easily accessible to 
the PHOSITA, it may represent the state of the art from which the 
obviousness determination should be made. Even if a reference would 
not be accessible to the PHOSITA, it may reflect common practices, 
even if that knowledge has not been documented in a widely 
disseminated form. Distribution of information can happen through 
various forums that the PHOSITA reviews, even if the PHOSITA 
does not specifically access the reference in question.151 The difficult-
to-locate publication indexed by subject may reflect understanding in 
the field. While examiners lack the resources to make that evaluation, 
courts generally have the time to delve into the difficult question of 
whether hidden references should be considered in assessing 
obviousness. 
Under the proposal set forth, courts should consider all prior art, 
regardless of whether it satisfies the analogous arts test, in assessing 
the obviousness of the claimed invention. In light of technological 
advancement, particularly increases in search technology and 
processing capabilities, the PHOSITA has access to “a virtually 
unlimited universe of prior art.”152 So, the question should not be 
whether the references are from the same field or reasonably pertinent 
to a subjective problem to be solved. That outdated analysis should 
be replaced by a bright-line rule allowing in all prior art, regardless of 
whether it is analogous. Courts can then return to the core of the 
obviousness assessment: the standards-based analysis set forth in 
Graham153 and reinforced in KSR.154 Specifically, from the perspective 
 
150. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 118, at 1170 (“[P]arties in 
litigation have far more time and money to spend than do patent 
examiners, and they are much more likely than the PTO to find the 
best prior art.”). 
151. See Lemley, supra note 10, at 745–48 (stating how patents “induce the 
communication of that information by other means”).  
152. Simon, supra note 11, at 335. 
153. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). 
154. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 399 (2007). 
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of the PHOSITA, the analysis should hinge on the differences between 
the prior art and the claimed invention, and whether the claimed 
invention is obvious in light of those differences. Given the 
importance of context in getting the obviousness determination right, 
a rich standards-based analysis is necessary. 
C. Weakening the Presumption of Validity 
The proposal has important ramifications for the deference 
accorded to patent validity during litigation. Scholars have widely 
criticized the presumption of validity as unsupported.155 Despite the 
significant limitations of prosecution mentioned previously,156 patents 
are afforded a presumption of validity.157 An alleged infringer has the 
burden of establishing invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.158 
This is true even for references that were not considered by the 
examiner during litigation.159  
The presumption of validity is particularly problematic under this 
proposal, which suggests that examiners discount difficult-to-locate 
prior art, stepping into the shoes of the PHOSITA to make a rough 
determination of obviousness using the analogous arts test during 
prosecution. Considering all of the flaws of the analogous arts test 
detailed previously, courts should reduce the presumption of validity 
during litigation, or at least allow for it to be overcome with proof by 
a preponderance of the evidence, rather than by clear and convincing 
evidence.160 Courts could interpret section 282 of the statute to lessen 
the burden of proof in this way, maintaining the presumption of 
validity while weakening the burden on challengers to overcome it.161 
For the proposal set forth here, adjusting the burden is necessary for 
difficult-to-locate prior art, given that examiners would only consider 
such art with skepticism.162 
 
155. See, e.g., Devlin, supra note 88, at 342; Lemley, supra note 16, at 1528–
30; Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 1. 
156. In addition, one study suggests that examiners fail to consider art unless 
they find it themselves. Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Do Applicant 
Patent Citations Matter?, 42 Res. Pol’y 844, 851 (2013) (suggesting 
that examiners essentially ignore applicant-submitted art, focusing 
instead on art they find themselves). 
157. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012). 
158. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011). 
159. Id. at 2244. 
160. See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 1, at 49. 
161. Lemley, supra note 16, at 1531. 
162. An exception to the skepticism of difficult-to-locate prior art might be 
made for patent applications that have been through in-depth post-
grant review.  
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IV. Objections to the Proposed Changes 
Some might question the proposed changes on a few grounds. 
Inconsistency with regard to applying the analogous arts test during 
prosecution and litigation might create confusion and greater 
uncertainty. Also, deferring a robust validity determination until 
litigation imposes costs, potentially injuring innovation and resulting 
in injustice.  
A. The Hobgoblin of Consistency 
One objection to the proposal is that the use of different 
standards in determining nonobviousness during prosecution and 
litigation could result in confusion and a lack of predictability. Many 
fundamental doctrines of patent law, however, are applied differently 
at different times. Three examples include (1) determining the 
meaning of the claims during proceedings before the PTO and courts, 
(2) defining the PHOSITA in divergent ways depending on the 
policies underlying the analysis, and (3) considering the scope of prior 
art differently for anticipation and disclosure purposes. 
Different standards apply for deciphering claim meaning during 
PTO proceedings and litigation.163 At the PTO, examiners interpret 
claims when assessing whether an invention is patentable. Examiners 
are required to give pending claims their “broadest reasonable 
interpretation . . . consistent with the specification,” though that 
standard is not present in other proceedings that are not before the 
PTO.164 By giving claims their broadest reasonable interpretation, the 
examiner can allow for the most expansive application of the prior 
art.165 The standards are different before the PTO because the 
circumstances are different from what they are in litigation.166 
 
163. John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: 
Administrative Alternatives, 2 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 109, 127 (2000) 
(suggesting that the standards are not tribunal dependent, and drawing 
a distinction between the treatment of issued and non-issued claims; 
“Both institutions apply the ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ method 
to construe claims not yet issued.”). 
164. In re Graves, 69 F.3d 1147, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting DeGeorge v. 
Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); USPTO, U.S. Dep’t of 
Commerce, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2111 (8th 
ed., 9th rev. 2012) (quoting In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 
2000)) (“[P]ending claims must be ‘given their broadest reasonable 
interpretation consistent with the specification.’”). See Dawn-Marie Bey 
& Christopher A. Cotropia, The Unreasonableness of the Patent Office’s 
“Broadest Reasonable Interpretation” Standard, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 285, 
295–96 (2009) (criticizing the use of the standard as unclear). 
165. In re Graves, 69 F.3d at 1152. 
166. In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Thus, claims may be 
valid and infringed in court but invalid in the PTO [during post-grant 
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Applicants in proceedings before the PTO can amend their claims to 
avoid the prior art; they can “correct errors in claim language and 
adjust the scope of claim protection as needed.”167 
As another example of inconsistency in application, the PHOSITA 
is defined differently depending on the circumstances. Decision makers 
emphasize different characteristics of the PHOSITA for purposes of 
obviousness, enablement, definiteness, written description, and 
equivalence.168 Indeed, “[b]ecause she is a legal construct designated to 
embody certain legal standards, the PHOSITA could well change 
depending on the purpose she is serving at the time.”169 For example, 
for obviousness purposes, decision makers view the PHOSITA as a 
problem solver.170 At that time, the PHOSITA exercising common 
sense and creativity can “fit the teachings of multiple patents 
together like pieces of a puzzle.”171 In the enablement context, 
however, the PHOSITA does not show “innovative tendency”; she is 
merely “a user of the technology.” 172 At most, the PHOSITA can fill 
in missing pieces in the disclosure during the analysis of 
enablement.173  
 
proceedings] and, a fortiori, not infringed.”); see Duffy, supra note 163, 
at 126. 
167. In re Etter, 756 F.2d at 858. 
168. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 118, at 1189–90 (“[The PHOSITA] 
might well display different and even inconsistent characteristics as 
between the different sections.”); see also Mark A. Lemley, The 
Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 101, 105 
(2005) (“There is a natural and understandable tendency to define the 
PHOSITA for claim construction purposes as the same person with the 
same knowledge as the PHOSITA for validity and infringement 
purposes, though that may in fact be an error.”); Timothy R. Holbrook, 
Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 Harv. J.L. & 
Tech. 1, 37–41 (2009) (“[C]ourts and the USPTO [should] assess 
enablement for validity purposes at the time of the application 
[and] . . . assess enablement for purposes of infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents at the time of infringement.”); Kristen Osenga, 
Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 Rutgers L.J. 61, 103–
04 (2006) (suggesting that the courts should spend more time defining 
“who the PHOSITA is and what the PHOSITA knows” during claim 
construction). 
169. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, 
54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 691, 712 (2004). 
170. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420–21 (2007) (redefining 
the PHOSITA as “a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton”). 
171. Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
172. Burk & Lemley, supra note 118, at 1190. 
173. Id. 
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Adding to the inconsistency in defining the PHOSITA, the 
knowledge of the PHOSITA in a given field can change over time. 
Decision makers determine the knowledge of the PHOSITA for 
obviousness under section 103 and the adequacy of disclosure under 
section 112 at the time of filing.174 For equivalents, however, the time 
of infringement is the focal point.175 Additionally, the characterization 
of the PHOSITA can vary depending on the technological field.176  
As another example of inconsistency, the universe of prior art 
available to the PHOSITA also varies depending on whether the 
decision maker is analyzing obviousness or the adequacy of disclosure. 
In particular, while difficult-to-locate prior art is considered in 
determining whether the invention is obvious to the PHOSITA, an 
inventor may not rely upon art that is not readily accessible to the 
public to show that a patent adequately discloses the invention.177 In 
refusing to allow consideration of obscure art in satisfying the 
requirements of section 112, patent law strives to meet the goal of 
ensuring that the inventor provides sufficient disclosure in the patent 
application. Because the public does not have sufficient access to 
difficult-to-locate prior art, inventors cannot rely on such art to cover 
for any deficiencies in their patent applications.178  
 
174. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (noting that under the pre-AIA law, 
obviousness is determined as of the date of invention).  
175. See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 
37 (1997) (“[T]he proper time for evaluating equivalency . . . is at the 
time of infringement . . . .”); see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 118, at 
1190 (“[T]he doctrine of equivalents PHOSITA . . . knows of all 
developments up to the date of infringement.”). 
176. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis 
and How the Courts Can Solve It 114–16 (2009) (“A PHOSITA-
based patent law must be industry-specific.”); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. 
Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575, 1650 (2003) 
(“Overwhelming evidence indicates that the application of the 
PHOSITA standard varies by industry . . . . ”); Lemley, supra note 168, 
at 102 (“Both the knowledge of the PHOSITA in a particular field and 
the meaning of particular terms to that PHOSITA will frequently 
change over time.”). 
177. Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1385 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (“If an incorporated reference, which is the sole support for a 
corresponding structure, is publicly unavailable, then the claim is not 
understandable.”); In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(“[A]ll prior art references in the field of the invention are available to 
this [PHOSITA].”); Burk & Lemley, supra note 118 at 1190 (“But 
conversely, hidden or nonpublic references which may serve as prior art 
under section 103 are not necessarily imputed to the knowledge of the 
PHOSITAs who make or use the invention under section 112, as such 
references are not readily available to the public.”). 
178. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 118, at 1190. 
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With assessing the meaning of the claims, defining the PHOSITA, 
and considering prior art, furthering the policies underlying the 
inquiry at hand has trumped consistency. That is, the context 
surrounding the determination of these issues allows for some 
divergence in the application of doctrine. Given the difficulty of 
applying the contextually intense determination of obviousness during 
the timeframe of prosecution, as compared with litigation, the 
application of the analogous arts test should similarly vary depending 
on the circumstances under which examiners and courts address 
obviousness.179 
B. The Costs of Deferring a Robust Evaluation of Obviousness  
Delaying a more in-depth analysis of obviousness until litigation is 
not without costs. Accused infringers will likely need to invalidate 
“bad” patents that might not have been issued had a more robust 
examination of obviousness taken place.  
1. The “Troll” Problem  
Patents that never should have been granted may be asserted by 
patent assertion entities (sometimes referred to as “patent trolls”) or 
other companies not typically defined as “trolls,” potentially impeding 
innovation.180 In 2012, one study found that corporate patent 
assertion entities brought 2,921 of 4,701 patent lawsuits, amounting 
to 62 percent of all patent litigation.181 Adding to the “troll” problem, 
judges have not regularly imposed fee-shifting in patent cases, other 
 
179. In addition, the ultimate determination of obviousness is a question of 
law, based on underlying factual determinations. See Graham v. John 
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–19 (1966) (noting that examiners lack formal 
legal training, suggesting another reason for divergent standards in 
assessing obviousness during prosecution and litigation). 
180. See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 Seton Hall L. Rev. 457, 
460–61 (2012) (“[T]he available information implies that NPE patent 
quality is not drastically lower than other litigated patents’.”). 
181. Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, (Santa Clara Univ. Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 09-12 17, 2000), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2146251 (noting that “patent assertion 
entities” are defined as businesses that assert patents as their primary 
business model); see also PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2013 
Patent Litigation Study 6 (2013), available at http://www.pwc. 
com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2013-patent-
litigation-study.pdf (“The number of patent actions filed reached 5,189 
in 2012 . . . .”); Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing, & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 
500 Expanded: The Effects of Patent Monetization Entities, (UC Has-
tings Research Paper No. 45 9, 22, 2013), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2247195 (“[P]atent monetization 
entities filed 58.7% of the patent lawsuits in 2012 . . . . We define a 
monetizer as one whose primary focus is licensing and litigating patents, 
as opposed to making products.”). 
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than in “exceptional” circumstances.182 From 2005 to 2011, courts 
awarded fees in only fifty-six cases per year on average, although 
there were approximately three thousand patent cases filed per year 
on average during that time period.183  
Recent discussion suggests that there may be more effective ways 
to deal with concerns about the assertion of weak patents, instead of 
making prosecution more complicated. Several proposals have 
suggested requiring greater disclosure of interests, making increased 
use of fee-shifting, and tightening the standards used in granting 
injunctive relief.184 These seem to be more tailored approaches to 
address the problem of the assertion of weak patents than requiring a 
more in-depth and costly analysis of obviousness during prosecution.185  
2. Companies Reluctant to Enter the Market 
Another concern with the proposal is that some companies may 
be reluctant to enter the market in view of patents that perhaps never 
should have issued.186 One assumption underlying the concern is that 
the reluctant companies are actually aware of the patents in the space 
that they seek to enter. In many instances, however, companies are 
discouraged from searching for patents by the threat of enhanced 
damages for willful infringement.187   
182. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012). But see Randall R. Rader et al., Op-Ed., Make 
Patent Trolls Pay in Court, N.Y. Times, June 5, 2013, at A25, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/make-patent-trolls-pay 
-in-court.html?_r=0 (arguing that courts should “make trolls pay for 
abusive litigation”). 
183. Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 Hous. L. Rev. 325, 
377 (2013). 
184. See Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 
2013, H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (2013); The White House, Office of the 
Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High-Tech 
Patent Issues (June 4, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-
issues; Rader et al., supra note 182, at A25. 
185. See Risch, supra note 180, at 481 (“NPE patents look a lot like other 
litigated patents . . . . They certainly do not appear to be worse than 
other patents.”). 
186. See Christopher R. Leslie, Patents of Damocles, 83 Ind. L.J. 133, 133 
(2008) (“[P]atents can be used as weapons against competitive rivals 
even without actually enforcing one’s patent rights in court. . . . [T]hese 
patents hang over the head of any potential entrant into the market.”). 
187. See Devlin, supra note 133, at 404 (“[T]he . . . danger of treble damages 
resulting from . . . willful infringement creates perverse incentives to 
remain ignorant of patented technology.”); Holbrook, supra note 133, at 
142 (“Given the risk of enhanced damages, a competitor has a 
significant incentive not to review patents at all.”); Roin, supra note 
133, at 2017 (“[M]any innovators now avoid reading patents to protect 
themselves from treble damage awards in infringement suits.”). 
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In situations where the reluctant company learns about a 
potentially problematic patent, the company may be more inclined to 
take a license from the patent holder than to refrain from entering the 
space.188 Where a patent is invalid, however, licensing causes an 
inefficient allocation of resources.189 Additionally, the patent holder 
might refuse to license the technology to its competitor, which would 
harm innovation if the patent were later found invalid.190 Although 
these are valid concerns, they may not come to fruition frequently or 
be significantly ameliorated by more robust prosecution than 
currently available.191  
3. Uncertainty About Validity 
The proposal, which allows examiners to make a “rough cut” of 
obviousness during prosecution but requires courts to spend more 
time on it during litigation, leaves the question of validity uncertain 
for a longer time. The question is when to impose the costs of 
determining obviousness. Obviousness is regularly challenged during 
litigation, as the PTO is not the final arbiter of validity.192 As such, 
regardless of whether examiners conduct a more robust examination 
of obviousness, litigants will continue to challenge validity in court.193  
While requiring greater scrutiny of obviousness during prosecution 
might limit the number of patents litigated, it would also impose 
costs during prosecution. Detailed examination requirements slow 
down patent prosecution, increase the backlog, and impose greater 
upfront costs on many patents that may never be asserted or licensed. 
A more in-depth analysis of obviousness during prosecution also 
increases the risk that some “good” patents will be found invalid, 
potentially undercutting innovation incentives and harming other 
worthwhile uses for patents, such as their signaling function for 
investment.194 Moreover, if the goal is to accurately determine 
 
188. See Lemley, supra note 16, at 1518. 
189. See id. 
190. See id. 
191. See id. at 1518–19 (concluding that some of the concerns about holdup 
licensing are “overstated” because approximately “338 patents [are] 
involved in holdups” each year, and “most patents are licensed either as 
part of a group of related patents, or [bundled with] patents with trade 
secrets and know-how,” making it “difficult to separate out a licensee’s 
motivation”). 
192. Id. at 1520. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 1522; Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting 
by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study, 17 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. 
L. Rev. 111, 153, 161 (2010) (describing the use of patents as 
“signaling” mechanisms to investors). 
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obviousness, litigants may be in a better position for this resolution 
than examiners. Unlike disinterested examiners, parties to litigation 
have a stake in the outcome and will generally make every effort to 
find the best evidence to support their arguments.195 Greater 
uncertainty about validity is the trade-off for more efficient 
prosecution. 
Conclusion 
The assessment of obviousness needs clarification. The goal of 
providing more predictability through the use of the analogous arts 
test has fallen short, given its focus on outdated factors. While the 
weaknesses of the analogous arts test can be overlooked during 
prosecution, given the constraints under which examiners operate, 
courts need to shift the focus to a standards-based approach, carefully 
considering the differences between the prior art and the claimed 
invention in evaluating obviousness. The focal point of the analysis 
during litigation should be on common practices in the innovative 
process, evaluating whether those practicing in the area actually 
would have had the time and inclination to appreciate the prior art 
and whether they would consider the invention obvious in light of it. 
Rather than using the analogous arts test as a shortcut, courts should 
engage in a rich assessment of the differences between the claimed 
invention and the prior art in determining obviousness. 
 
 
195. Lemley, supra note 16, at 1522. 
